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Abstract
Is growth in capitalist economies wage-led or prot-led? Empirical
studies have found conicting results for di¤erent countries and periods.
Possible reasons may include di¤erences in the monetary policy/exchange
rate regimes across countries and between macro behavior in the short-
and medium-runs. I theoretically explore these possibilities using a port-
folio balance framework to keep track of asset stocks and wealth e¤ects
over time. With xed exchange rates, the Central Banks need to intervene
in the asset market via o¢ cial reserve transactions results in assigning a
crucial role to the current account in constraining accumulation and out-
put. The binding nature of this constraint vanishes with exible exchange
rates. The most important message that emerges is that, once we impose
plausible constraints on dynamic behavior, factors other than the nature
of the demand regime determine the e¤ect of redistribution on utilization,
income, and accumulation over the medium run. The demand regime
loses relevance for reasons that vary with the exchange rate regime.
JEL classications: F32, F43, E25, E42, E64
Key words: Demand regime, wage-led growth, stagnationism, exhila-
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1 Introduction
Growth in Keynesian models is demand-led. In a closed economy, this means
that, barring an overwhelmingly strong investment response to demand, redis-
tribution in favor of spenders should boost growth. As pointed out by Blecker
(1989) and others, open economy considerations complicate the picture. The
e¤ect of re-distribution in a large open economy depends on the response to
real exchange rate changes. An increase in the prot share through a higher
mark-up results in real appreciation and a decline in external competitiveness.
Demand su¤ers as a result, making prot-led growth less feasible. A decline in
the wage too increases the prot share but now makes the economy more com-
petitive, which facilitates prot-led growth. Prospects for wage- or prot-led
demand growth (stagnationismand exhilarationism in the words of Mar-
glin and Bhaduri (1988)) in an open economy, therefore, depend crucially on the
source of the re-distribution. An economy that is prot-led when insulated from
the rest of the world may well metamorphose into a wage-led open economy.
The strength of the e¤ect of redistribution on competitiveness is only one
potential source of di¤erences between open economies. Variation in exchange
rate regimes between countries that peg their currencies to a xed standard and
others that let their currency values oat in the market to take polar extremes 
is another factor that complicates open economy behavior. Di¤erences may also
emerge between short- and longer-run responses of macroeconomic aggregates.
In fact these and other factors may at least partly explain the mixed empirical
results regarding the nature of the demand and growth regimes.1
The above discussion makes clear that the traditional mechanism through
which redistribution inuences the scope for wage-led or prot-led growth in an
open economy works through the trade balance. Since capacity utilization is
the adjusting variable in such models, a loss of competitiveness results in down-
ward pressure on demand and income. An obvious constraint that is missing
from the picture is that of the balance of payments. What follows once re-
distribution creates a trade surplus or decit? With xed exchange rates, the
Central Bank would have to defend the value of the currency through o¢ cial
reserve transactions, in the process accumulating or decumulating foreign ex-
change reserves. This process cannot be expected to last for ever. With exible
exchange rates, the exchange rate would be expected to move in response either
to the trade imbalance or the asset accumulation or decumulation entailed by
the current account imbalances. Moreover, as private and o¢ cial asset holdings
change, one would expect consumption behavior to be impacted through wealth
e¤ects. A careful examination of the relationship between income distribution
and demand should, therefore, take these dynamic aspects into account. To the
best of my knowledge, only one paper, Razmi (2014), looks at these stock and
ow relationships over time. However, this paper limits the analysis to xed
exchange rates, and does not contrast the behavior of macro aggregates under
xed versus oating regimes. The present paper is an attempt to ll these gaps.
1Cite Blecker (2015) here.
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In order to analyze dynamic processes, I incorporate wealth e¤ects a la
Metzler (1951) and portfolio considerations in the spirit of Tobin (1969). This
enables the analysis to incorporate balance of payments constraints over time
while exploring the stock-ow relationships alluded to earlier. The main results
are derived not only for demand and output changes, but also in terms of steady
state stocks of real (capital) and nancial assets. Perhaps three of these results
can be seen as the most important:
1. The nature of the demand regime becomes irrelevant in determining how
income redistribution a¤ects the steady state level of output, utilization,
capital, and wealth once one extends the basic neo-Kaleckian framework
to incorporate plausible constraints on behavior over time. Other factors
such as trade behavior assume a pivotal role instead.
2. The nature of the binding constraint on output varies with the exchange
rate regime. With xed exchange rates, the steady state stock of capital
can be higher or lower following a re-distribution towards prots depending
on whether trade responds more elastically to income or relative price
changes. The same factor determines the e¤ect on steady state wealth.
With a oating (or exible) exchange rate, by way of contrast, the relative
responsiveness of the trade balance to income and relative price changes
ceases to be relevant to the steady state stock of capital, although it
continues to matter for the steady state stock of nancial assets. Indeed,
in the simplest specication, the former is unmoved by re-distribution.
3. Redistribution toward prots through a higher mark-up factor reduces
steady state utilization regardless of the nature of the demand or exchange
rate regimes. Redistribution away from prots through higher real wages
will have similar consequences.
It may be important to note here that the contrast in the extent to which
the external account constraint binds the steady state stock of capital does not
arise from the assumption that, with exible exchange rates, the currency value
adjusts to keep the current account balanced. Indeed, the exchange rate is
assumed to be determined in the asset markets.
The next section presents broad conceptual details of the framework. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 analyze the e¤ects of re-distribution under di¤erent exchange rate
regimes. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic framework
In the analysis that follows, I will consider trade openness in an imperfect
substitutes framework. The country, in other words, exports a good that is
an imperfect substitute for the foreign-made goods that it imports. Thus, the
country is not a price-taker in international markets. This specication, which
is in keeping with previous literature and the spirit of the demand-led neo-
Kaleckian framework, leads to a simple specication where the trade balance
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is a negative function of domestic real income Y and, as long as the Marshall-
Lerner condition is satised, a positive function of relative prices q (i.e., in this
context the real exchange rate). Thus,
T = T (Y; q); TY < 0, Tq > 0 (1)
where q (= eP =P ) is the ratio of the foreign and domestic price levels (P  and
P , respectively) at the nominal exchange rate e (the domestic currency price of a
unit of foreign currency). When later normalized by the capital stock, the trade
balance function will be expressed with capacity utilization u ( Y=K) as an
argument instead of Y , so that T=K = t(u; q). This specication assumes ho-
mogeneity with respect to output. Although conceptually problematic,2 we will
use this notation to stay as close to the traditional neo-Kaleckian specication
as possible.
The foreign price level is given (and assumed to be 1 without loss of gener-
ality), as is the exchange rate in the case of the xed regime. Domestic price
level behavior is dened in the neo-Kaleckian manner as a mark-up over average
variable costs. That is,
P = (1 + )wa (2)
where  is the mark-up factor, w is the nominal wage, and a is the unit labor
coe¢ cient. The prot and wage shares of output,  and 1  , then are given
by:
 =

1 + 
, 1   = 1
1 + 
This simple pricing behavior means that the real exchange rate is a function
of the prot share and the inverse of unit labor costs (expressed in terms of the
foreign price level).
q =
wa
P
eP 
wa
= (1  )z (3)
One could follow Blecker (2002), Razmi (2014), and others in introducing par-
tial pass-through of unit labor cost (wa) changes into prices, but I eschew that
complication here to focus on the main theme, i.e., the comparison of behav-
ior under xed versus oating exchange rates. The downside of making this
trade-o¤ in favor of complete pass-through is that redistribution can only occur
through changes in the mark-up factor. This, however, does not a¤ect our main
results as listed in Section 1.
Before we complete the description of the goods market, a quick detour to the
asset side would be useful. The economy has three assets: (liquid) money that
pays no return, internationally traded bonds that are denominated in foreign
2For example, the assumption of homogeneity has the troubling implication that doubling
both output and the capital stock does not a¤ect the magnitude of imports (recall that, in
the one country imperfect substitutes framework, output a¤ects the trade balance through
imports).
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currency, and non-traded equity (claims on real capital). The country is small
in the international bond market so that the return to holding bonds, r, is
given while that to holding equity is rK .3 Wealth W is the sum of the real
values of money balances (M), net domestic holdings of foreign bonds (F ), and
equity, (K) all measured in terms of the domestic good:
W M + eF +K (4)
At a point in time, the allocation of a given wealth portfolio across foreign
and domestic assets is a stock equilibrium problem. In line with standard port-
folio balance specications, asset market equilibrium conditions are captured by
equations (5)-(7).
M = HM (rK ; r
)W ; HMrK ;H
M
r < 0 (5)
eF = HF (rK ; r
)W ; HFrK < 0;H
F
r > 0 (6)
K = HK(rK ; r
)W ; HKrK > 0;H
K
r < 0 (7)
Asset demands are homogenous in real wealth and the asset demand func-
tions capture shares that must add up to unity (HM +HF +HK = 1). The
signs of the partial derivatives indicate that the assets are gross substitutes;
HKrK = H
M
rK +H
F
rK .
4 For the oating exchange rate case, I impose the further
restriction that portfolio holders are equally sensitive to changes in rK when
deciding their holdings between money and bonds. This has the plausible im-
plication that the own-price elasticity of assets (with respect to rK) is greater
than the cross-price elasticity, and renders the results more compact without
loss of generality.
The goods market equilibrium condition involves saving and investment be-
havior. One could specify investment in the traditional way as a function of
the prot share and demand (proxied by income). In our case, however, we
have the additional presence of an equity market. Investment would, therefore,
be expected to vary negatively with the cost of issuing equity. That is,
I
K
= i(rK)u; irK < 0 (8)
where the right hand side is normalized by K, so that the rate of capacity uti-
lization u is proxied by the ratio of output to the capital stock (= Y=K). This
simplest of formulations is subject to the Marglin-Bhaduri critique.5 However,
3 I assume that debt is short-term so that its capital value is essentially independent of the
interest rate. Assuming that equity is internationally traded will render the composition of
asset portfolios indeterminate.
4To keep things simple, these asset demand specications ignore transactions demand for
assets.
5See Marglin and Bhaduri (1990).
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it has the advantage of greatly simplifying the discussion of the intuition be-
hind the steady state results without much loss of generality. A more general
specication that avoids this problem would be:
I
K
= i(rK ; ; u); irK < 0, i, iu > 0
This specication leaves the steady state results largely unchanged in a qual-
itative sense, and while I will focus on the former specication for the analysis
over the next two sections. Appendix B presents the analysis for the latter. I
will contrast the two wherever anything of interest is to be gained from doing
so.
Only capitalists save and savings are specied as a proportion of prots in
the traditional manner. However, the introduction of asset markets and wealth
now makes it reasonable to include asset returns and wealth as arguments in
the saving function. These arguments determine the proportion of prots that
is saved.
S
K
= s(rK ; r
;W )u; srK , sr > 0, sW < 0 (9)
One would expect higher asset returns to encourage more saving. Moreover,
if, as suggested by Metzler (1951), savers have a target level of wealth, the
propensity to save out of current income will vary negatively with current wealth.
In an open economy, national saving need not equal investment, so that
the goods market clearing condition, expressed in domestic currency terms,
becomes:
[s(rK ; r
;W )  i(rK)]u  et(u; q)  er F
K
= 0
or, in implicit form,
IS(rK ; u;K;M;F; r
; e; ) = 0 (10)
Throughout the analysis I assume that the current account balance initially
equals zero, i.e., T + rF = 0. The initial net foreign asset position could in
theory be positive, zero, or negative (F R 0). In the interest of maintaining
focus on the role of exchange rate regimes, I suppose that r is negligibly small.
Given an initially balanced current account, this means that trade too is initially
balanced. Higher cost of equity reduces investment and generates excess supply.
The traditional Keynesian stability condition requires a similar outcome from
an increase in income. Thus, ISrK , ISu > 0. A rise in any component of
wealth has the opposite e¤ect via the Metzler channel; ISM , ISK , ISF < 0.
A nominal depreciation raises demand through expenditure-switching, through
the wealth channel, and by changing the domestic currency value of income from
net foreign lending. The rst e¤ect is positive as long as the Marshall-Lerner
condition is satised. The second e¤ect is unambiguously positive. Finally,
since the country is neither a net foreign creditor or debtor, i.e., F = 0, the
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third e¤ect is negligible. A rise in the international interest rate on borrowing
raises the saving rate; ISr > 0.
The partial with respect to  spotlights the nature of the demand regime.
In a wage-led (or stagnationist) regime, a higher mark-up creates excess supply,
because of both lower domestic spending and expenditure switching towards
foreign goods (so that IS > 0). In a prot-led (or exhilarationist) regime,
the expenditure switching is more than o¤set by increased domestic investment
demand so that IS < 0.
The previous discussion sums up the general contours of the short-run part
of the framework. The stocks of assets and thus wealth are pre-determined
variables for this time window. Income (or, equivalently, utilization) and equity
prices vary, along with the exchange rate (in a oating regime) and the stock
composition of privately-held nancial assets (in a xed regime).
Over time, the stocks of assets evolve in response to ows. The stock of
nancial assets grows (declines) with current account surpluses (decits) while
the stock of capital changes in proportion to investment. I assume away cap-
ital depreciation for simplicity although including it will have no qualitative
e¤ect on the analysis. The steady state involves constant shares of total wealth
being allocated to nancial and real assets. It also ensures no net accumula-
tion or decumulation of foreign exchange assets by the country or the Central
Bank. Insofar as the mark-up factor and wages are constant, and there is no
presumption towards the adjustment of utilization rates towards a desired level,
the steady state is better seen as existing over the medium-run rather than
the long-run. Thus, the analysis involves steady state stocks of assets over the
medium-run punctuated by a continuum of short-run equilibria in which asset
stocks may deviate from their steady state values but income and asset returns
have adjusted to their equilibrium values.
Thus far we have summarized the broad contours of our analysis. The
devil is in the details which will vary with the exchange rate regime over the
next two sections. Most importantly, with a xed exchange rate regime, the
Central Bank is committed to maintaining the exchange rate, in the process
satisfying domestic demand for foreign assets through balance sheet operations.
With exible exchange rates, the absence of such a commitment means that the
exchange rate can do some of the heavy lifting involved in adjustment to income
re-distribution. The two polar cases give rise to interesting contrasts.
3 Redistribution with xed exchange rates
With a xed exchange rate, and at a given level of wealth, the central bank
stands ready to accommodate excess private demand for nancial assets. In
other words, the monetary authorities defend the exchange rate by absorbing
any compositional shift within private holdings of nancial assets. It is thus the
total quantity of nancial assets, V = M + eF , rather than the composition,
that matters, so that equations (5) and (6) can be consolidated into a single
equation:
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V = HV (rK ; r
)W (11)
Given the wealth constraint expressed by equation (4), which can be re-
written as W  V +K, eqs. (7) and (11) are not independent, and solving the
equity market clearing condition (equation (7)) is adequate by Walrass Law to
derive the equilibrium solution for rK . Once rK is known, equation (10) then
pins down the equilibrium solution for u.
3.1 Short-run comparative statics
Three thought experiments are the most relevant for the purposes of our analy-
sis, the e¤ects of changes in: (i) income distribution, (ii) the stock of nancial
assets, and (iii) the capital stock. The detailed solutions for these comparative
static exercises are provided in the mathematical appendix at the end of this
paper. The solutions, expressed in implicit form, are as follows:
rK = rK(V;K; ); rKK > 0, rKV < 0, rK ? 0 (12)
u = u(V;K; ); uV > 0, uK , u ? 0 (13)
where overbars indicate short-run equilibrium values. Lets take a look at the
intuition underlying each comparative static result.
An expanded supply of nancial assets puts downward pressure on return
to equity. A lower rK is required, in other words, to remove excess supply
of nancial assets through portfolio substitution. This in turn encourages
investment and lowers savings. Thus, a higher level of V boosts income through
two channels: (i) by boosting investment relative to savings through a lower rK ,
and by directly increasing wealth and, therefore, reducing savings through the
Metzler wealth e¤ect.
Increased supply of real assets (K) too lowers saving via the wealth e¤ect
but has the opposite e¤ect on rK . The intuition is simple. Portfolio switching
is now required toward equity rather than away from it to remove the excess
supply of K. The net e¤ect on u is, therefore, ambiguous, and depends on the
relative strengths of the wealth and investment cost e¤ects.
Finally, income re-distribution toward prots through a higher mark-up fac-
tor has no e¤ect in the asset markets.6 Thus, equilibrium rK is unchanged.
The only e¤ect is on the goods market where we are now back to the analysis
of Marglin and Bhaduri (1988). If the demand-regime is stagnationist (i.e.,
(s  i)u  etqz > 0), excess supply is generated, so that u declines. An exhila-
rationist regime produces the opposite result.
6This would change if I introduce transactions demand for money and other assets.
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3.2 Evolution over time
Thus far we have established that u(t) and r(t) dene instantaneous (moving)
equilibria. Non-zero values of saving and investment mean the stocks of wealth,
capital, and nancial assets are continuously changing. As far as the rate of uti-
lization is concerned, the short-run framework delivers analysis and conclusions
similar to the traditional neo-Kaleckian one.
Consider now the evolution of asset stocks over time. The accumulation
of capital stock over time follows the ow of investment dened by equation
(8). The path of nancial assets, by denition, follows the net foreign asset
position, which in turn is dened by the path of the current account ows over
time. Thus, the change in nancial assets between any two periods is given by,
_V = S   I = T (Y; q) + erF . Recalling the assumption that r  0,
V^ =
S   I
V
=
K
V

S
K
  I
K

= t(u; q)
K
V
= V^ (V;K;) (14)
K^ =
I
K
= i(rK)u
= K^(V;K;) (15)
where ^ indicates that the associated variable is expressed in growth rate
form, and the right hand side of each equation makes use of eqs. (12) and
(13). The wealth shares of nancial and real assets are bound from both
the lower and upper ends. Over an extended period of time, it is therefore
reasonable to assume that these shares are stable. This consideration helps
dene the steady state as characterized by V^ = K^ = 0. Setting V^ = 0 also has
the additional advantage of ensuring that, over the medium run, the current
account is balanced and saving equals investment. Furthermore, this ensures
that the Central Bank is not accumulating or decumulating foreign exchange
reserves in the steady state. This is realistic since there is a oor to the foreign
exchange reserves (in theory zero, but in practice, much higher) that a Central
Bank must maintain in order to credibly maintain the exchange rate. Finally,
from equation (4), national wealth is also constant in the steady state. With
the stock of wealth held constant, so is rK (see equation (11)). Constant
asset stocks and returns to assets then ensure, via the goods market equilibrium
condition (equation (10)), that output and the rate of capacity utilization too
are unchanging. In sum, the steady state is characterized by:
V^ = K^ = W^ = M^ = F^ = Y^ = r^K = S^   I^ = S^ = I^ = 0
Is the system dynamically stable? Intuitively, the answer appears to be
a¢ rmative. If, in an initial instantaneous equilibrium, (u; rK) deliver positive
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investment, this raises K, and hence rK , thus dampening investment. Simi-
larly, if (u; rK) deliver current account surpluses, the resulting nancial asset
accumulation lowers rK , which has the e¤ect of dampening this accumulation.
As seen earlier in Section (3.1), however, the wealth e¤ect complicates matters.
This is because accumulation of real and nancial assets through investment
and external surpluses also increases wealth over time, which tends to increase
spending and, therefore, to further magnify investment.
More formally, denoting the reciprocal of the traditional Keynesian multi-
plier by  (= (s   i)   eTY > 0 from the Keynesian stability condition), the
determinant of the endogenous variable Jacobian is given by:
FixedL =
 V^V V^KK^V K^K
 =  etuirKsWHKrKW KV 2u2 > 0
which is unambiguously positive. The trace is given by:
TrFixed =
+= z }| {
K
V
etu + i

(srK   irK )
HK
HKrKW
  sWW ) 
+z }| {
i(srK   irK ) H
K
HKrK
W
+
 z }| {
irK

1 HK
HKrKW




which is very likely to be negative. Notice that only the rst term in the
numerator on the right hand side is ambiguously signed. The remaining terms
are negative. More specically, a su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for
a negative trace is that
K
V etu
 > jij, i.e., roughly trade respond more than
investment, in absolute terms, to changes in income. The necessary condition
is, of course, much less stringent, and very likely to be satised.
3.3 Increasing the prot share
What are the consequences of a policy-induced re-distribution that favors the
prot share? As shown in the analysis in Section 3.1, the short-run equilibrium
will correspond to a higher or lower level of output and utilization, depending
on whether the demand-led regime is wage-led or prot-led in the short-run.
This is the traditional neo-Kaleckian result. Unlike most existing literature,
however, our analysis here is interested in the steady state stocks of capital and
the corresponding levels of output and utilization. We are interested, in other
words, in the longer run prospects for wage-led or prot-led growth.
Before we discuss the comparative dynamics in more detail, lets take a quick
look at the mathematical expressions for the changes in the steady state stocks
of capital and nancial assets ( ~K and ~V respectively):
d ~K
d
=
(tqz + tuu)
h
sW i  (srK i  sirK ) H
K
HKrK
W
i
FixedL
eK
V
u (16)
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d ~V
d
=  
(tqz + tuu)
h
sW i+ (srK i  sirK ) 1 H
K
HKrK
W
i
FixedL
eK
V
u (17)
Consider rst the steady state stock of capital. Notice that the terms in the
square brackets are both negative, while tqz > 0 and tuu < 0. Whether ~K is
higher or lower following redistribution depends on whether the trade balance is
more sensitive to relative price changes (in which case ~K is lower) or to income
changes (in which case ~K is higher). Put di¤erently, d ~Kd 7 0 as jtqzj ? jtuuj.
We turn to the intuition behind this condition shortly.
For the steady state stock of nancial assets, again the relative trade elastic-
ities matter, but now in addition, the magnitude of the wealth e¤ect on savings
plays a role as well. The combination of a large relative price e¤ect on the trade
balance and a strong wealth e¤ect will lead to a higher steady state stock of
nancial assets. Other combinations will yield di¤erent outcomes.
Lets turn to the underlying intuition to explain why these results follow
from our framework. The key relationship driving the steady state results
is the current account balance expression on the right hand side of equation
(14). With a xed exchange rate, internationally determined bond returns,
and negligible investment income, there is only one degree of freedom here. For
the current account to be balanced following a real appreciation (i.e., a rise in
q), utilization must be lower in the new steady state. Stated di¤erently, for
equation (1) to hold from one steady state to another,
du=u
d=
=
tqz
tuu
(< 0) (18)
This relationship determines the proportional change in utilization required
to maintain the current account as we move from the old steady state to the new
one following redistribution. If jtqzj > jtuuj, that is, if the trade balance is
more sensitive to relative prices than to utilization, the latter needs to fall more
than proportionately to the rise in prot share so that the volume of prot (u)
declines. Equation (15) then tells us that the steady state returns to equity
must be lower. This, in turn, implies, given equation (12), that the steady state
stock of capital too be lower. Turning to savings, since the volume of prots
and the returns to holding equity have both declined, equation (9) tells us that
the stock of wealth too must be lower in the new steady state.
By contrast, if jtqzj < jtuuj, u needs to fall less than proportionately to
the rise in  so that the volume of prot (u) rises. This means, from equation
(15), that the steady state returns to equity must rise and so, therefore, must
the stock of physical capital. This in turn means that the stock of wealth must
also be higher in the new steady state to maintain saving at its steady state
level (eqs. (9) and (14)). The stock of nancial assets may decline or rise in
both cases.
To sum up, with a xed exchange rate, the current account imposes a bind-
ing constraint on output and the steady state level of capital stock. Steady
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state utilization unambiguously declines to maintain current account balance
in response to redistribution-induced real appreciation. The magnitude of
this decline, which depends on the relevant trade elasticities, then determines
whether the steady state level of capital stock and wealth are higher or lower.
The nature of the demand regime, that is whether (s  i)u  etqz 7 0, does not
matter.
Table 1 summarizes the steady state results.
Table 1: Comparative dynamics
Fixed exchange rate Floating exchange rate
jtqzj > jtY uj jtqzj < jtY uj jtqzj > jtuuj jtqzj < jtuujeK   + 0 0eV or ~F +=  +=    +fW   + 0 0eu        erK   + 0 0
eu   + 0 0eY   +=     e +  
*Assumes a relatively weak wealth e¤ect on savings
4 A oating regime
Unlike the xed exchange rate case, the Central Bank no longer commits to
defending the value of the currency. This removes the role of the current
account as the determinant of output changes following redistribution. As
we will see shortly, this role is now played by steady state investment behavior.
Note that this happens in spite of the fact that the exchange rate is not assumed
to adjust to balance the external account. Rather, it is determined here in the
asset markets.
The basic set-up, as dened by equation (1)-(10) remains the same as before.
In order to focus on comparing exchange rate regimes, I assume static expecta-
tions, so that, with uncovered interest parity holding, the domestic interest rate
on bonds continues to be tightly bound to the international one. Given the
change of exchange rate regime, some variables undergo a functional identity
change. Since the Central Bank does not intervene in the foreign exchange
market, the nominal exchange rate takes the place of M as the endogenous
variable, and liquid money and net holdings of foreign assets can no longer be
amalgamated into a single variable. Two out of the three asset market equilib-
rium conditions (5)-(7) are now independent. The exchange rate adjusts along
with rK to maintain equilibrium in these markets. Income is then determined
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in the goods market by equation (10). The short-run model retains its recursive
nature.
4.1 Short-run adjustments
Again, three comparative statics help complete the analysis for this paper:
(i) Increased net holdings of foreign assets has no e¤ect on returns to equity,
thanks to the homogeneity embedded in equation (6). The exchange rate
adjusts downward instead, proportionally to the initial change in F . This is
a standard result in open economy macro literature. The real appreciation, in
turn, causes reduced demand for domestic goods as long as the Marshall-Lerner
condition is satised. Output and utilization decline as a result. Notice that
the latter results are the opposite of what we got in the xed case.
(ii) Unlike the case of increased foreign asset holdings, the exchange rate
does not bear the entire burden of adjustment in the asset markets when the
stock of physical capital increases. Rather, the excess supply of equity puts
upward pressure on rK . This means that the e¤ect on the exchange rate and
output are both ambiguous. Consider rst the former. Increased rK creates an
excess supply of foreign assets which tends to appreciate the exchange rate. The
increase in wealth resulting from the higher K, on the other hand, generates
increased demand for foreign assets, which tends to depreciate the exchange
rate. The net e¤ect is determined by the relative strengths of the two e¤ects.
Mathematically,
de
dK
=
HF  HM
1 +HM  HF
1
F
The denominator is always positive. The numerator is negative if domestic
residents hold a greater share of liquid money than foreign assets in their wealth
portfolio. I assume this to be true from now on, on grounds of both plausibility
and simplicity, although this does not a¤ect any of the steady state results.
Thus, de=dK < 0. This is consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson and the
Bhagwati-Kravis-Lipsey e¤ects.
To understand why the e¤ect on output is ambiguous, recall again that
output is pinned down in the goods market once e and rK have been determined
in the asset markets. This means that the appreciated equilibrium value of the
exchange rate and the higher rK both lower the equilibrium value of output.
The increase in wealth, by contrast reduces savings, generates demand, and
boosts output. Equilibrium output rises in the presence of a strong wealth
e¤ect and falls otherwise.
(iii) Finally redistribution in favor of prots has no e¤ect on the asset
markets. The e¤ect on output is exactly identical to that in the xed case,
i.e., negative if the demand-regime is wage-led and positive otherwise. In the
short-run at least the demand regime matters.
The discussion above can be encapsulated by equations (19)-(21). More
detailed mathematical expressions are provided in the appendix.
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rK = rK(F;K; ); rKK > 0, rKF = 0, rK = 0 (19)
e = e(F;K; ); eK < 0, eF (=  e=F ) < 0, e = 0 (20)
u = u(F;K; ); uF < 0, uK , u ? 0 (21)
Before, we turn to exploring the evolution of income ows and asset stocks
over time, it would be useful to look at the current account again. Recall that
it is given by eT (u; q) + erF . With e pre-determined under a xed exchange
rate, and international investment income ows negligible (because r  0), a
real appreciation has to be o¤set by a fall in income to maintain current account
balance. This is no longer true under a exible exchange rate regime since now
changes in stocks and asset returns inuence the path of the exchange rate. As
pointed out earlier, the current account, therefore, no longer directly constrains
the path of output and accumulation. In terms of steady state analysis, this is
the major di¤erence between the two exchange rate regimes.
4.2 Back to the medium-run
Since the Central Bank now controls the availability of money and foregoes
o¢ cial reserve transactions, it is the stock of net foreign holdings rather than
that of nancial assets that evolves in line with current account imbalances.
The other equations of motion remain the same as in the xed case.
Again, the accumulation of capital stock over time follows the ow of invest-
ment dened by equation (8). The net foreign asset position evolves in line
with the saving-investment gap. Thus, the change in nancial assets between
any two periods is given by _F = S   I = T (Y; q) + erF . Or,
F^ =
S   I
F
=

S   I
K

K
F
=

t(u; q) + er
F
K

K
F
= F^ (F;K;) (22)
K^ =
I
K
= i(rK)u
= K^(F;K;) (23)
Again, the steady state is characterized by stock and ow equilibrium so
that
K^ = W^ = F^ = Y^ = r^K = S^   I^ = S^ = I^ = 0
The determinant of the endogenous variable Jacobian is given by:
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FlexL =
 z }| {
sW iW +
+z }| {
(sirK   srK i)
HM
HFrKW
(1 +HM  HF )
etqK
F 2
2u
which is positive as long as the wealth e¤ect is not too strong (for reasons dis-
cussed intuitively in the xed exchange rate case). The presence of a su¢ ciently
strong wealth e¤ect would lead to saddle path (in)stability. Since the aim here
is to compare regimes and steady states, I focus on the stable case. Loosen-
ing the assumption of static expectations would make the saddle path case an
interesting one for future work to pursue.
The trace is given by:
TrFlex =
+= z }| {
[(srK   irK )iF + irKKetu]
HM
HFrKW
  sW iF

u 
+z }| {
tqq(H
M  HF )
(1 +HM  HF )F
which is negative unless the term involving sW dominates the other terms.
Thus, a not too strong wealth e¤ect on savings ensures a negative trace and a
positive endogenous variable determinant.
4.3 The comparative dynamics of re-distribution - again
As shown in the analysis in Section 4.1, the system yields the traditional neo-
Kaleckian result in the short-run equilibrium, whereby the change in output
depends on whether the demand regime is prot- or wage-led. As we saw earlier,
this result does not carry through to the medium-run in the xed exchange rate
case. Are things di¤erent under a exible regime?
Before we discuss the comparative dynamics in more detail, lets take a quick
look at the mathematical expressions for the changes in the steady state stocks
of capital and nancial assets ( ~K and ~F respectively):
d ~K
d
= 0 (24)
d ~F
d
=   tuu+ tqz
tqq
F (25)
The major di¤erence from the xed case is that the steady state level of
capital stock is immune to income re-distribution. Why is that the case?
To understand the intuition, recall that the current account no longer directly
constrains the level of output. That burden now falls on investment behavior.
Income re-distribution and output change a¤ect both saving and investment in
the same direction but changes in returns to equity a¤ect them in the opposite
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direction.7 This implies that the saving and investment behavior requires a
given steady state level of rK . Finally, recall from the previous sub-section
that the equilibrium level of rK changes in response to changes in the capital
stock but remains unchanged following changes in net foreign assets. In other
words, an unchanged steady state level of rK requires an unchanged steady state
level of capital stock (although the stock of nancial assets can change). This
explains the striking result encapsulated by equation (24).
What determines the change in the steady state stock of nancial assets.
Here trade elasticities become relevant again. Notice rst from equation (23)
that, since the steady state level of rK is unchanged, a re-distribution toward
prots must result in an equiproportional decline in the steady state level of
utilization so that the volume of prots (~u) is unchanged. This means, from
equation (9) that the steady state level of wealth is unchanged. With ~W
and ~K unchanged, the value of foreign assets measured in domestic currency
~e ~F too must be the same. Given the homogeneity built into equation (6),
any change in F is, therefore, accompanied by o¤setting movements in the
exchange rate. This is the key to understanding what happens to ~F . To
understand the intuition better, lets re-visit equation (18). If jtqzj > jtuuj,
then re-distribution towards prots creates a current account decit. As the net
foreign asset position deteriorates along the transition path, the excess demand
for foreign assets appreciates the exchange rate. The end result is a lower
steady state value of ~F accompanied by a depreciated nominal exchange rate.
If jtqzj < jtuuj, then the opposite results hold; an appreciated exchange rate
co-exists with an improved net foreign asset position in the new steady state.
The right half of Table 1 summarizes these results.
5 Implications and concluding remarks
The seminal contribution of Marglin and Bhaduri (1988) showed that the na-
ture of the demand regime determines the e¤ects of exogenous changes in income
distribution on output and utilization. The analysis presented here qualies
those results by demonstrating that while this may be true in the very short
run, the evolution of asset stocks and returns over time in the presence of plau-
sible constraints on aggregate behavior render the nature of the demand regime
irrelevant. I then extend the analysis by comparing the short- and medium-run
consequences of income re-distribution under di¤erent exchange rate regimes.
In each case, the outcome in terms of the steady state values of output, utiliza-
tion, asset stocks, and wealth depend on constraints other than those imposed
by the nature of the demand regime. Moreover, with exible exchange rates,
income re-distribution may have no impact on the steady state levels of capital
and wealth in the medium-run.
A note of caution before concluding. One can see from Table 1 that re-
distribution towards prots results in a decline in steady state utilization regard-
less of exchange rate regime. Does this mean that demand in the medium-run
7See eqs. (8) and (9).
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is always prot-led? The answer is no. One would get the same results were
one to re-distribute towards wage income through a higher nominal wage.8 The
key take away here is that the demand regime and the form that re-distribution
takes do not matter over time. Other structural constraints prevail instead.
The analysis carried out here is highly stylized; the aim was to analyze
steady state changes under di¤erent exchange rate regimes in the most direct
way, after minimizing the number of moving parts that would add useful, but
only tangentially interesting detours to the analysis. Noteworthy assumptions
include: (i) only capitalists save, (ii) a negligibly low international interest rate
on short term bonds, (r  0), (iii) no transactions demand for money or other
assets, and (iv) static expectations. Perhaps it would be useful to briey
re-visit these assumptions to explore the robustness of our results. The rst
assumption is a standard one in neo-Kaleckian literature and weakening it by
assuming a non-zero saving rate out of wages (i.e., sW > 0) will make the
analysis substantially more complicated, since one would have to separately
keep track of wealth by ownership. The second and third assumptions could
qualitatively a¤ect the results, which, in the case of assumption (ii) will now
depend on whether the country starts out as a net foreign debtor or creditor
(i.e., whether F T 0). Assumption (iv) nally will not a¤ect the analysis in the
case of a credibly xed exchange rate. It may a¤ect the analysis in the case of
a oating regime, in terms of the stability of the steady state. However, it will
not a¤ect the steady state solutions. Future work should explore some of these
avenues. Furthermore incorporating imported inputs so that the prot share is
a¤ected by exchange rate changes may also yield additional insights. It should
be emphasized here, however, that none of these extensions will a¤ect the most
striking result of the paper, i.e., that plausible restrictions on the evolution of
stock variables render the nature of the demand regime, classied as wage-led
or prot-led, irrelevant to steady state outcomes.
6 Appendix A
This Appendix presents the detailed mathematical results from the main text
in cases where they were not provided earlier.
Section 3.
The detailed expressions for the various comparative static results are as
follows (where  = (s  i) eTY > 0 is the inverse of the traditional Keynesian
multiplier term):
drK
dV =   H
K
HKrKW
< 0
du
dV =  
sW (srK irK ) H
K
HK
rK
W
 u < 0
d W
dV = 1
drK
dK =
1 HK
HKrKW
> 0
8Although to analyze this experiment, one would have to complicate the analysis by intro-
ducing partial pass-through from wage costs into prices as in Blecker (2002).
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du
dK =  
sW+(srK irK ) 1 H
K
HK
rK
W
 u ? 0
d W
dK = 1
drK
d = 0
du
d =   (s i)u+etqz ? 0
d W
d = 0
For the comparative dynamics part, the following partials follow from equa-
tions (14) and (15):
V^V =
 
etu
@u
@V

K
V
V^K =
 
etu
@u
@K

K
V
V^ =
 
etu
@u
@   etqz

K
V
K^V =
 
irKu
@rK
@V + i
@u
@V


K^K =
 
irKu
@rK
@K + i
@u
@K


K^ =
 
 @u@ + u

i
Section 4.
drK
dF = 0
de
dF =   eF < 0
du
dF =   e(T+tqq)F < 0
d W
dF = 0
drK
dK =   H
M
(1+HM HF )HFrKW
> 0
de
dK =
HF HM
(1+HM HF )F > 0
du
dK =  

sW (srK irK ) H
M
HF
rK
W

u+tqq
HM HF
F
(1+HM HF ) ? 0
d W
dK =
1
1+HM HF > 0
de
d = 0
drK
d = 0
du
d =   (s i)+etqz ? 0
d W
d = 0
For the comparative dynamics part, the following partials follow from equa-
tions (22) and (23):
F^F = e

tu
@u
@F   tqqF

K
F
F^K = e
 
tu
@u
@V + tqq
@e
@K

K
V
F^ = e
 
tu
@u
@   tqz

K
F
K^F = i
@u
@F
K^K =
 
irKu
@rK
@K + i
@u
@K


K^ =
 
 @u@ + u

i
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7 Appendix B
This Appendix presents the steady state results for the case where the invest-
ment function addresses the Marglin-Bhaduri critique, and is given by:
I
K
= i(rK ; ; u); irK < 0, i, iu > 0
A Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
d ~K
d
=
tqz
h
sW iuu+ (sirK   srK iuu) H
K
HKrK
W
i
+ tuu
h
sW i + (sirK   srK i) H
K
HKrK
W
i
Fixed
0
L
eK
V
d ~V
d
=  
tqz
h
sW iuu  (sirK   srK iuu) 1 H
K
HKrK
W
i
+ tuu
h
sW i   (sirK   srK i) 1 H
K
HKrK
W
i
Fixed
0
L
eK
V
where Fixed
0
L =   etuirK sWu .
Again, the steady state result for the capital stock depends on jtqzj ? jtuuj,
as in the baseline specication in the main text. The result for the steady
state stock of nancial assets is more involved, and, again, as in the baseline
specication, may have either sign. The results remain independent of the
nature of the demand regime.
A Flexible Exchange Rate Regime
d ~K
d
=
s(i   iuu)
Fixed
0
L
tqq
F
eK
F
d ~F
d
=   1
Flex
0
L (1 +H
M  HF )

tqz

sW iuu+ (sirK   srK iuu)
HM
HFrKW

+tuu

sW i + (sirK   srK i)
HM
HFrKW

+

s(i   iuu) tqq
eF
 
HM  HF  eK
F
where Flex
0
L =
(sirK srK iuu) H
M
HFrK
W
+sW iuu
(1+HM HF )F etq.
Barring the special case where i = iuu, the steady state stock of capital
does change in response to redistribution (unlike the result in the main text).
The e¤ect on the steady state stock of nancial assets is ambiguous, as in the
main text, and depends partly on the relative trade elasticities. The nature of
the demand regime remains absent as a determinant.
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